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MANDATORY DISCLOSURE THEORY AND MANAGEMENT
PROJECTIONS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS
PERSPECTIVE
ROGER J. DENNIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines the debate over the utility of the Securi-
ties Exchange Commission's (SEC or Commission) mandatory dis-
closure of management information by examining proposals to
expand that system to require disclosure of management forecasts
and valuation judgments. Whether the present system of
mandatory disclosure, or an expanded version, is in the interest of
investors turns on a series of related questions. First, does the cur-
rent mandatory disclosure system create useful information, other-
wise unavailable, or other benefits such as reduced information
collection costs for market professionals or investors generally?
Second, do the benefits of governmental intervention outweigh the
costs of the regulatory system created by mandatory disclosure?
Third, would required periodic or transaction-oriented disclosure of
management forecasts and valuation judgments change the calcula-
tion of benefits and burdens of mandatory disclosure?
To explore these questions, I first review the history of SEC and
court regulation of disclosure of "soft" forward-looking information
and outline the current state of the law on disclosure of forecasts
and valuation judgments as its exists in different contexts. I then
discuss the debate in the law and economics literature concerning
the utility of mandatory disclosure in general and of forecast disclo-
sure in particular. Finally, I propose a rule that would mandate man-
agement disclosure of earnings and valuation judgments when
control transactions are pending.
II. HISTORY OF THE REGULATION OF MANAGEMENT DISCLOSURE OF
FORWARD-LOOKING INFORMATION
Traditionally, the SEC took a highly negative position on the
disclosure of soft information such as projections and appraisals.'
* Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law. B.S., Northwest-
ern University, 1971;J.D., 1974.
1. The court in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973),
summarized the basis of the SEC's policy. The policy against the inclusion of projections
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The Commission believed that this information was unreliable, sub-
ject to manipulation by management, and would be given undue
weight by investors.2 Thus, the Commission did not permit such
information in SEC-filed documents.' The SEC did, however, allow
issuers to disclose soft data in informal communications with ana-
lysts or in press releases.4 As a consequence of the Commission's
policy, courts have traditionally refused to hold companies liable for
failing to disclose projections and appraisals.'
Beginning in the 1970s the Commission began to change its
attitude toward disclosure of soft information in mandated filings.6
or appraisals in proxy statements or other mandated-disclosure documents stemmed
from a deep distrust of their reliability, a concern that investors would rely too heavily
on such appraisals, and a belief that the Commission's staff would not be able to check
authenticity reliably. Id. at 1294. For a comprehensive history of the development of
SEC policy on disclosure of projections and appraisals, see Brown, Corporate Communica-
tions and the Federal Securities Laws, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 741 (1985); Comment, The SEC
Safe Harbor For Forecasts-A Step in the Right Direction, 1980 DUKE L.J. 607. See also Schnei-
der, Soft Information Disclosures: A Semi-Revolution, 1984 INST. ON SEC. REG. 19; Schneider,
Nits, Grits, and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 254 (1972). As used by
most commentators, the term "soft information" covers data that is not factual in the
narrow sense, such as a prediction of futu.e value or future earnings.
2. See Guidelines for the Release of Information by Issuers, Securities Act Release
No. 5180, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,192, at 80,578
(Aug. 16, 1971) ("Any publication by a company in registration should be limited to
factual information and should not include such things as projections, predictions, fore-
casts or opinion with respect to value.").
3. The earliest SEC proceedings permitted inclusions in registration statements of
earnings and future valuation predictions if made with a reasonable basis. In the Matter
of Ypes Cadillac Mines, Ltd., 3 S.E.C. 41 (1938); In the Matter of American Kid Co., 1
S.E.C. 694 (1936). Thereafter, a firm Commission policy developed, precluding such
statements in both registration statements and continuous disclosure documents. In the
Matter of Thomas Bond, Inc., 5 S.E.C. 60 (1939); SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS, A
REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS 96
(1969) [hereinafter the Wheat Report]. See also Comment, Fearless Forecasts: Corporate
Liability for Earnings Forecasts That Miss the Mark, 16 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 115, 116-17
(1974).
4. As early as 1966, between 25% and 33% of widely held companies released, in
some manner, earnings projections to the financial press. Other firms affirmatively com-
municated this information to securities analysts on an informal basis, while almost all
firms would respond in some form to analysts' queries on the subject. The only limita-
tion on these types of communications occurred when a firm was in registration under
the 1933 Act. See Comment, supra note 3, at 118. However, another study states that
only approximately 10% of firms presently publicly disclose earnings projections. See F.
LEES, PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE EARNINGS FORECASTS (Conference Board,
1981).
5. See, e.g., Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 253 (6th Cir. 1985); South Coast Servs.
Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d 1265, 1271 (9th Cir. 1982); Vaughn
v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d 1214, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 1980); Panter v. Marshall Field &
Co., 646 F.2d 271, 292-93 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
6. The change in the Commission's position in the 1970s followed the filing of its
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The Commission recognized that forward-looking data was perhaps
the most useful type of information for investors. 7 Moreover, the
Commission's traditional policy exacerbated the problem of selec-
tive disclosure to favored analysts. This put unsophisticated inves-
tors, intended beneficiaries of the no-disclosure rule, at a potential
competitive disadvantage. 8 The Commission therefore promul-
gated a series of releases and a safe-harbor rule, which were
designed to encourage the use of projections.
The SEC held hearings in 1972 on the use of projections.9 Fol-
lowing these hearings, the Commission issued a release that allowed
the use of projections in 1933 Act'0 registration statements and in
1934 Act" continuous disclosure documents as long as the projec-
tions were made in good faith and with a reasonable basis.' 2 Subse-
quently, the SEC proposed rules governing the preparation of
projections.' 3 Issuers severely criticized the proposed rules, partic-
ularly the requirement to update and disclose the assumptions be-
hind the projections. 14 Finally, in 1979 the Commission adopted its
current safe-harbor rule concerning projections. 15 In large part the
amicus brief in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F. 2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973), which
asserted that a merger proxy statement could be materially misleading if it did not dis-
close asset appraisals when the appraisals were substantially different than book value.
The Second Circuit rejected this position, primarily because it was a substantial depar-
ture from the Commission's past practice.
7. Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 5362, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,211, at
82,667 (Feb. 2, 1973).
8. To the extent that the practice is widespread, the disclosures made to analysts
are, in effect, to the market as a whole.
9. In the Matter of Estimates, Forecasts or Projections of Economic Performance,
Exchange Act Release No. 9844, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
79,075 (Nov. 1, 1972).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77kk (1982).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (1982).
12. Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities
Act Release No. 5992, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,756 (Nov.
7, 1978). Disclosure of such information remained voluntary, as did disclosure of the
assumptions behind a projection. The SEC warned issuers, however, to correct projec-
tions that had become outdated. Selective tipping of a projection to favored analysts,
for example, would be subject to Commission scrutiny under the rules against insider
trading.
13. Proposed Rules on Earnings Projections, Securities Act Release No. 5,581,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,167 (Apr. 28, 1975).
14. Earnings Projections and Rule 14a-9 Amendment, Securities Act Release No.
5699, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,461 (Apr. 23, 1976).
15. Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 6084, [1979 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,117 (June 25, 1979) (adopting SEC rule 175,
17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1986)). The safe harbor protects forward-looking statements
made in continuous disclosure documents, annual reports used in the proxy solicitation
1987] 1199
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
rule codifies existing Commission policy and court rulings on pro-
jections. 6 Projections remain protected from attack if they are made
in good faith and with a reasonable basis. The plaintiff has the bur-
den of establishing that a projection did not meet this standard of
care." The Commission did not, however, require disclosure of as-
sumptions behind a projection, although it did remind issuers that
failure to disclose assumptions might render a particular projection
materially misleading. 8 In addition, the Commission left the issue
of updating to case-by-case development rather than rule, but
alerted issuers to a general duty to update for changes regarding
assumptions or operations.' 9
The Commission's activities in this area have led to considera-
ble confusion in the recent case law on when issuers or others might
be required to disclose projections or appraisals. Most courts begin
their analysis by noting the Commission's earlier hostility to disclo-
sure of soft data and its subsequent decisions not to mandate such
disclosures.20 Some courts simply end their analysis here, with the
broad conclusion that projections are not material.2 ' Other courts
have concluded that reasonably certain projections may indeed be
process, proxy statements, and registration statements. The rule also protects forward-
looking statements made outside an SEC filing if the firm reaffirms them in a subsequent
filing. The rule defines forward-looking statement to include projections of revenue,
earnings, capital expenditures, and statements of management plans and objectives.
The safe harbor also protects a disclosed assumption behind any protected, forward-
looking statement.
16. Brown, supra note 1, at 800. A leading case which might be read to present a
more stringent test of liability for forward-looking statements is Beecher v. Able, 374 F.
Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Beecher involved the registration of debentures of Douglas
Aircraft. The prospectus stated: "It is very likely that the net income, if any, for fiscal
1966 will be nominal." Id. at 346. The court construed the statement to mean that the
company believed there would be no substantial loss as well as no substantial gain. Id. at
347. The company in fact lost $52 million. Id. at 344. With respect to the risk of loss,
the court stated that Douglas would be liable under § 11 of the 1933 Act unless the
company based the forecast on facts from which a reasonably prudent investor would
conclude that it was highly probable that the forecast would be realized. Id. at 348. The
court also held that the firm must disclose the assumptions underlying the projection if
their validity is in doubt. Id.
17. Securities Act Release No. 6084, supra note 15, at 81,940.
18. Id. See also Securities Act Release No. 5992, supra note 12.
19. Securities Act Release No. 6084, supra note 15, at 81,943. See Marx v. Computer
Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding an issuer liable for failing to up-
date a projected development schedule for a new product).
20. See, e.g., Harkavy v. Apparel Indus., 571 F.2d 737, 741 (2d Cir. 1978); Resource
Exploration v. Yankee Oil & Gas, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 54, 63 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
21. See, e.g., Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 199-200 (7th Cir. 1978). Some courts
still make the same argument with respect to appraisals. See Pavlidis v. New England
Patriots Football Club, Inc., 737 F.2d 1227, 1236 (1st Cir. 1984); South Coast Servs.
Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d 1265, 1271-72 (9th Cir. 1982).
1200 [VOL. 46:1197
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material but, except in the context of insider trading cases, remain
reluctant to find liability for a failure to disclose.22
As in other areas of corporate law, the boom in control transac-
tions has forced several courts to rethink the issue of required dis-
closure of projections or appraisals. 2' Three recent courts of
appeals cases raise the issue of whether a firm must disclose soft
information while a control transaction is pending. Each case cre-
ates an apparently different standard to be applied in determining
whether a duty to disclose exists. The Third Circuit stated an ex-
pansive duty to disclose in Flynn v. Bass Brothers Enterprises.24 Bass
Brothers, the controlling shareholder of National Alfalfa, made an
any-and-all tender offer for the remaining minority shares of Na-
tional. While Bass Brothers did disclose that the assets of National
were potentially worth substantially more than book value and that
on liquidation National might be worth more than the tender offer
price, Bass Brothers did not disclose that it had a third-party ap-
praisal that valued the assets well in excess of the market price and
offering price for National. Measured against the standards of dis-
closure that existed in 1976, the specific holding of the case was that
Bass Brothers.did not have to disclose the appraisal. 25 The court
22. See, e.g., Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1985); SEC v. Bausch &
Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); Alaska Interstate Co. v. McMillian, 402 F. Supp. 532
(D. Del. 1975). Cf. In re Digital Equip. Sec. Litig., 601 F. Supp. 311 (D. Mass. 1985)
(denying summary judgment when affidavits raised factual issue concerning potential
knowingly false projection).
23. In recent years there has been an unprecedented number of mergers, hostile
tender offers, going-private transactions, repurchases, and recapitalizations (so-called
control transactions).
24. 744 F.2d 978 (3d Cir. 1984). For detailed commentary on Flynn, see Comment,
Mandatory Disclosure of Soft Information in the Market for Corporate Control, 35 EMORY L.J. 213
(1986). As the commentator observes, the Flynn court does not discuss when the duty to
speak arises. When an outsider makes an information discovery and then makes a
tender offer based on that discovery, one can make a persuasive case for no duty to
speak. This protects the discovery value and encourages production of new informa-
tion. The duty to disclose plans and proposals under the Williams Act limits this ability
to withhold. Thus, a firm must disclose a plan to liquidate, as well as the basis of the
plan. Without specifically so holding, it appears the court deemed Bass Brothers to be
an insider with a duty to speak. See also Note, A Hard Look at Soft Information, 16 SETON
HALL L. REV. 511 (1986); Note, Target Corporation Disclosure of Soft Information in Tender
Offer Contests, 54 FORD. L. REV. 825 (1986) [hereinafter Fordham Note].
25. Because of the evolution of SEC disclosure policy since 1976, the Third Circuit
concluded under the facts of the specific case that it would be unfair to apply contempo-
rary disclosure standards. Rather, it decided the case under the law as it existed in 1976.
744 F.2d at 988. The district court had directed a verdict for Bass Brothers because it
believed that the appraisal was not based on sufficient information. The appellate court
stated that the result of the case might well have been a case for thejury. Id. at 991 n.22.
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found that the report was not prepared in connection with the
tender offer, nor was it prepared by expert appraisers.26 Thus, the
court held that the report did not have sufficient indicia of reliability
to require disclosure.
More significant than the actual holding of the case is the test
set out by the Flynn court. The court attempted to define when soft
information is material under the TSC Industries "total mix" test.27
Therefore, courts in the Third Circuit will have to determine on a
case-by-case basis whether soft information should be disclosed.
Under the Flynn test, courts must weigh the information gains to be
derived from disclosure against the potential harm from disclosure,
such as investors' undue reliance on the data. 28 In striking the bal-
ance, the factors a court should consider include: the expertise of
the report preparer; the purpose for which the report was prepared;
the availability of the data from other sources; and the degree of
subjectivity reflected in the report's preparation. 29 Although not
worked out in any detail, the thrust of this test is to mandate disclo-
sure in some instances in which the prior case law would have per-
mitted nondisclosure. If the corporate decisionmaker used the
report in connection with the transaction, disclosure would often be
required. The Flynn test also balances the importance of the infor-
mation against the uncertainty of the outcome.
Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co.3" and Radol v. Thomas3 present the
question of whether an offeror or an offeree must disclose asset ap-
praisals and earnings projections in connection with competing
tender offers. The Sixth Circuit held the specific reports to be im-
26. Id. at 989. The report was prepared so that a third party could obtain acquisition
financing for a planned purchase of National, although it is also possible that Bass
Brothers itself relied on the report for its business decisions concerning National.
27. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976):
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote .... It does
not require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact
would have caused the reasonable investor to change his [or her] vote. What
the standard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that,
under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual signifi-
cance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put another way,
there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly al-
tered the "total mix" of information made available.
28. 744 F.2d at 988. Courts must also balance the importance of the information
against the uncertainty of the outcome.
29. Id.
30. 772 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1985).
31. 772 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1985).
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material as a matter of law. According to the court, soft information
must be disclosed depending on the certainty of the underlying
data.3 2 The court rejected the Flynn test, believing that the balanc-
ing approach was too uncertain and unpredictable. Furthermore,
the court believed that, at least in the tender offer context, the mar-
ket would produce soft information through competing tender of-
fers. 33 Thus, future-oriented information is material in the Sixth
Circuit only if "substantially certain to hold." 34
This standard leaves few, if any, instances in which soft infor-
mation is deemed sufficiently certain to require disclosure. By defi-
nition, the standard projection or appraisal is speculative and
uncertain.35 Thus, the Sixth Circuit has held that cash-flow and
earnings projections prepared for use in a selling document and in-
terim earnings reports are sufficiently uncertain.36 Under the test,
the Sixth Circuit has consistently refused to require disclosure of
soft information.
Walker v. Action Industries 37 presents the Fourth Circuit's view on
the necessity of disclosing income and sales projections in the con-
text of an issuer self-tender. The duty to speak here is clear under a
fiduciary duty/insider trading analysis. As to the question of materi-
ality, the precise test adopted by the Fourth Circuit is difficult to
ascertain. The court did state that "[wie do not hold that there is no
duty to disclose financial projections under any circumstances. '"38
However, it rejected a duty to disclose in the particular case because
it considered the uncertain nature of the specific projections signifi-
cant.3 9 Furthermore, the court stated that "we believe that a further
32. Starkman, 772 F.2d at 241.
33. Although not stated in law and economics terms, this represents the notion of
self-induced disclosure. The target would release positive soft-information in an effort
to fend off a raid. The court did not consider the situations in which management con-
flicts would create incentives to withhold information.
In addition, the court discouraged the disclosure of uncertain soft data by requiring
disclosure of "the basis for and limitations on the projected realizable values." 772 F.2d
at 241. This goes beyond the SEC's statements that require disclosure, in some situa-
tions, of the basis for a projection or appraisal when needed to avoid the projection's
being deemed materially misleading.
34. Radol, 772 F.2d at 253.
35. As Brown, supra note 1, at 789-99 n.257 states, absent hindsight it would be
difficult to establish that any projection is substantially certain.
36. Biechele v. Cedar Point, Inc., 747 F.2d 209, 216 (6th Cir. 1984);James v. Gerber
Prods. Co., 587 F.2d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 1978); Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414,
421 (6th Cir. 1974).
37. 802 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1986).
38. Id. at 710.
39. Id.
1987] 1203
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transition from permissive disclosure to required disclosure should
be occasioned by congressional or SEC adoption of more stringent
disclosure requirements for financial projections, rather than by
courts." 40 The court relied on the fact that the SEC had no specific
requirement to disclose this particular data in the self-tender
rules.4 Finally, the court expressed concern that creating an obliga-
tion to disclose soft information would place issuers at undue risk of
liability, even with the safe harbor, if the prediction turned out in-
correct.42 These SEC rule-based reasons would apply to all projec-
tions, regardless of their certainty. It seems, then, that the Fourth
Circuit might not even undertake the minimal-certainty scrutiny re-
quired by the Sixth Circuit.43 The Fourth Circuit approach leads to
the conclusion that under the current state of the law, corporations
need not disclose any projections.
State courts have faced the similar issue of whether failure to
disclose a projection during a control transaction violates state law
duties of care and loyalty. The Delaware Supreme Court opinion in
Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co.44 is a typical case. The case involved a par-
ent-subsidiary merger in which the minority shareholders of the
subsidiary received securities of the parent as consideration. 45 Dur-
ing the pendency of the transaction the parent prepared a routine
projection that showed a decline in earnings for the next fiscal
year.46 Yet the court stated that the nondisclosure did not violate
any state law duty, primarily because the projection was not specifi-
cally prepared in connection with the merger transaction and be-
cause the court believed that disclosure of the projection would not
have affected the negotiations over the exchange ratio. 47 The
court's belief that disclosure would not have affected negotiations,
however, cannot be correct. A decline in the parent's earnings
would be reflected in the value of the parent's stock, and thus would
adversely affect the exchange ratio for the merger transaction.
Whatever valuation model is used, to the reasonable investor such
40. Id. at 709.
41. d.
42. Id. at 710.
43. In fact, the court declined to "specifically adopt any of the various positions held
by the other circuits regarding whether a duty exists to disclose financial projections."
Id. at 709 n. 11.
44. 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985). In determining that the earnings projection was not
material under the state law complete-candor test, the Delaware Supreme Court claimed
that it was using the federal total-mix test of materiality. Id. at 944-45.
45. Id. at 931.
46. Id. at 938.
47. Id. at 939.
1204 [VOL. 46:1197
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information would be material. Moreover, for two reasons there is
no question concerning a duty to speak. There was a pre-existing
fiduciary relationship between the parent and subsidiary, and the in-
formation was material inside information affecting the decision on
how to vote. The court nonetheless held that projections of this
sort are not facts that need to be disclosed under the Delaware re-
quirement of complete candor in parent-subsidiary mergers.4 a
Thus, under both federal and state law-even after the SEC's
change in policy toward disclosure of forward-looking data-there is
a considerable reluctance to require disclosure of such information.
No court has yet held a firm liable under any of the articulated tests
for nondisclosure. Some courts even appear to go so far as to say
that no firm will ever be liable for such nondisclosure in the absence
of further rulemaking on the part of the SEC or new legislation.
III. THE DEBATE CONCERNING THE UTILITY
OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
The first thirty years of federal regulation of the securities mar-
kets saw little debate concerning the theoretical underpinnings of
the SEC's work. The conventional wisdom was that mandatory dis-
closure significantly improved the quality and quantity of manage-
ment disclosure and that mandated disclosure stood as the bulwark
against securities fraud. 49 However, for the past twenty years aca-
demics, using the law and economics perspective, have vigorously
debated the utility of SEC-mandated disclosure. This debate is part
of a more general reassessment of the utility of governmental regu-
lation when a market-based solution might be available.5 ° The de-
bate over the limits of securities regulation has been particularly
intense as additional scholars apply modem financial theory to is-
sues of securities regulation.5
Until the regulatory-reform revisionists focused on the SEC,
there was a widely held consensus that mandatory disclosure was
necessary because the market would not naturally produce suffi-
48. Id.
49. Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP.
L. 1 (1979). Professor Seligman is the leading historian of the development of the fed-
eral securities laws.
50. See generally Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alterna-
tives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 547 (1979).
51. The efficient market model is the starting point for the analysis of securities reg-
ulation problems for those using the law and economics perspective. The implications
of viewing the securities markets as highly efficient information processors are discussed
infra notes 56-57, 71, 73-81, and accompanying text.
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cient, truthful information concerning issuers.52 Furthermore,
mandatory disclosure was a significant deterrent to fraud. The revi-
sionist critique of the SEC's work started in 1964 with the work of
George Stigler. 3 In a classic of regulatory-reform literature, Stigler
attempted to measure empirically the benefits of mandatory disclo-
sure and weigh those benefits against the costs of SEC regulation.
Stigler examined the returns of investors in new issues, both before
and after the passage of the 1933 Act. He concluded that, while the
Act may have reduced the volatility of investors' returns, there was
no statistically significant evidence that its passage actually en-
hanced investors' returns. Stigler believed these results showed that
the costs of compliance did not outweigh any benefits arising from
the Act. The reduction of volatility in new-issue prices only demon-
strated that the cost of compliance excluded smaller, untested issu-
ers from the public capital markets. In a later study of new issues,
Professor Gregg Jarrell produced similar results.54
A parallel empirical challenge was also made to the utility of the
continuous disclosure requirement mandated by the 1934 Act. Pro-
fessor George Benston studied the market's reaction to the passage
of the 1934 Act and concluded that investors did not respond posi-
tively to enhanced mandatory continuous disclosure. 55 Arguments
based on the efficient market model buttressed these empirical stud-
ies. Securities prices generally reflect all publicly available informa-
tion concerning the firm.56 The security's price promptly reflects
new information. Much of what is contained in SEC-mandated dis-
closure forms is not new information, so disclosure is arguably irrel-
evant to investor judgments on risk and return.57
The statistical studies criticizing mandatory disclosure have
been challenged on both methodological and theoretical grounds.
Commentators have attacked the experimental design of the studies
and the inferences they drew, even if statistically accurate.5 8 Sup-
52. Seligman, supra note 49, at 2.
53. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964).
54. Jarrell, The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market for New Security Issues,
24J.L. & EcON. 613 (1981).
55. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Ex-
changeAct of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132 (1973).
56. For a leading current description of the efficient market model, see Gilson &
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549 (1984).
57. Wolfson, A Critique of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 30 EMORY L.J. 119
(1981).
58. Professor Seligman comprehensively describes and evaluates these critiques. See
Seligman, supra note 49. See also Friend & Westerfield, Required Disclosure and the Stock
Market, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 467 (1975).
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porters of mandatory disclosure have also suggested that the reduc-
tion in variance of investor returns shows an investor benefit from
disclosure.59 Moreover, recent scholarship has raised doubts about
whether any time-series" empirical work can provide information in
a fundamental way on the question of benefits arising from
mandatory disclosure.6 Central changes in the securities markets
limit the usefulness of all historical data. Thus, the growth of securi-
ties' analysis and institutional investing plus the elimination of fixed
commissions make comparisons across time problematic. 62
The more current revisionist scholarship on mandatory disclo-
sure discusses the topic from a theoretical perspective. A significant
school of thought suggests that mandatory disclosure is unnecessary
because firms have sufficient incentives, even in the absence of regu-
lation, to produce an optimal amount of information concerning
themselves.6" The market will receive confirmation of released in-
formation through the firm's dividend policy, managerial ownership
of shares, and debt issuance. With regard to information itself, in-
vestors will insist on transaction and continuous disclosure in the
initial sale of the securities and to ensure an adequately liquid
aftermarket. Managers will comply in order to maintain the price of
the firm's shares, not only in one-shot transactions, but also to en-
sure repeat access to the capital markets. The incentives for liquid-
ity-based disclosure are further enhanced when firms compensate
59. Friend & Herman, Professor Stigler on Securities Regulation: A Further Comment, 38 J.
Bus. 106 (1965).
60. Time-series studies use stock market price movement data to measure the effect
of regulation on securities prices. These studies assume that the stock market is highly
efficient and that, if regulation is beneficial, the benefits will be reflected in positive price
movements.
61. Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA.
L. REV. 717, 719-21 (1984). Professor Coffee provides a complete survey of the eco-
nomic arguments for and against a mandatory disclosure system. I use his article as a
framework for assessing the debate concerning the utility of mandatory disclosure.
62. In 1975 fixed commissions on securities transactions were eliminated, leading to
reduced transaction costs for market trades. This may have reduced the incentive for
some market professionals to collect data while at the same time increasing investor
incentives to exploit smaller potential disparities between the current market price and a
future price that reflects new information.
63. E.g., Diamond, Optimal Release ofInformation by Firms, 40J. FIN. 1071 (1985) (sug-
gesting that firms may voluntarily disclose in order to increase firm value ex ante, because
such disclosure reduces information collection costs and improves risk-sharing). See also
Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV.
669, 673-77 (1984) (suggesting that mandatory disclosure may be needed to buttress
voluntary disclosure because of the risk of insular state shareholder protective legisla-
tion and third-party competitive effects, reducing the incentives for self-induced
disclosure).
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managers with stock or stock-based packages, thus tying manage-
ment's personal wealth to firm performance.64 These factors create
a community of interest between managers and shareholders de-
spite the separation of ownership and control.65
Even though there are incentives to disclose, there are signifi-
cant countervailing, residual agency costs as well. Disincentives for
voluntary disclosure exist, which means that the community of inter-
est between managers and shareholders is incomplete.66 Without
disclosure the opportunity for insider trading would be marginally
greater.6 7 Moreover, there are natural disincentives to voluntary
disclosure of negative information. Nondisclosure of adverse infor-
mation may not only preserve the value of a manager's personal
portfolio but also reduce the likelihood of a hostile takeover bid.
Furthermore, managers may withhold information until they can
correct negative outcomes. Concerns over the disclosure of nega-
tive information are also supported by empirical evidence. The evi-
dence is particularly strong with respect to soft data. Managers
delay disclosure of negative information until it becomes inevita-
ble.68 Positive soft information, such as an earnings projection, is
often disclosed by informal means, while soft negative information
is rarely disclosed quickly.
In addition, mandatory disclosure might force the disclosure of
good news, news that might not be released if managers were con-
templating a self-tender or leveraged buyout.69 These disincentives
64. Publicly traded corporations routinely compensate executives based on firm per-
formance as reflected in stock prices. F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 35-37 (2d ed. 1980). At least with respect to good news, exec-
utives have considerable incentives for firm-specific disclosure.
65. The theory thus would imply that the agency costs with respect to disclosure are
zero. On agency costs, see Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
66. Coffee, supra note 61, at 737-43 (1984). Mandatory disclosure also reduces
third-party effects. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 63, at 685-87, 697. See also infra
notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
67. The effect of mandatory disclosure on the opportunity for insider trading may be
marginal. Mandatory disclosure filings are sufficiently episodic that much insider trad-
ing can occur long before a filing is necessary. But at the margin there may be instances
in which a mandatory duty to disclose reduces the opportunity for insider trading, par-
ticularly if the information needs to be disclosed in form 8-K.
68. Pastena & Ronen, Some Hypotheses on the Pattern of Management's Informal Disclosures,
17J. AcCT. RES. 550 (1979).
69. Coffee, supra note 61. Because many managers perceive their long-run interest
as remaining in control of a public corporation, however, managers tend to reveal soft
positive information while suppressing soft negative information. There is some self-
induced disclosure, but the process is far from optimal. See Pastena & Ronen, supra note
68.
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to disclosure exist, in large part, because of the dynamic nature of
the present market for corporate control. As a consequence of this
market, managers may not believe that they will be repeat players in
the capital markets, at least with respect to their current firm. Both
in good- and bad-news situations this may lead, in the absence of
mandatory disclosure, to less than optimal, self-induced levels of
disclosure.7 °
A related critique of mandatory disclosure suggests that the effi-
cient market makes government regulation irrelevant, and thus
needlessly costly. Securities prices reflect the information contained
in mandated-disclosure documents often long before filing.7 '
Therefore, whether the information in SEC documents is voluntarily
released by issuers or ferreted out by securities analysts, it is simply
not news. Eliminating mandatory disclosure will thus not affect the
amount of information available to investors, but will reduce issuer
compliance costs.
This attack on mandatory disclosure can be challenged on a va-
riety of levels. First, mandatory disclosure may enable investors to
measure the risk level of their portfolios more efficiently. 72 Second,
firm-specific information, revealed in mandatory disclosure docu-
ments, can be useful to professional traders even if the new-infor-
mation content of the disclosure document is not substantial.
Particularly as the stock markets become more dominated by profes-
sionally managed trading, an understanding of the role of securities
analysts is essential to an understanding of the policy implications of
disclosure through an efficient market. Even though markets are
highly efficient, it may be a rational investment strategy to use a se-
curities analyst to collect and evaluate information.73 Sufficient
noise exists in the price-signalling mechanism so that investors at
least appear to earn an ordinary return from an investment in the
services of analysts.74 In determining an investment strategy these
70. Coffee, supra note 61.
71. See, e.g., Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25J.
FIN. 383, 387 (1970).
72. Coffee, supra note 61, at 724; Gordon & Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Infor-
mation, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985); Pozen, Money Managers and
Securities Research, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 923 (1976).
73. Fischel, Insider Trading and Investment Analysts: An Economic Analysis of Dirks v. Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 127, 140-44 (1984).
74. Bjerring, Lakonishok & Vermaelen, Stock Prices and Financial Analysts' Recommenda-
tions, 38J. FIN. 187 (1983). The use of analysts in efficient securities markets creates an
apparent paradox. Analysts are the engines of market efficiency. They collect informa-
tion and evaluate it, and either directly or indirectly communicate the information to the
market through the price-signalling mechanism. Yet if analysts' efforts create complete
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analysts use the widest available data sets. Mandatory disclosure
documents are part of the information used. 75 At a minimum, ana-
lysts can use these documents to compare and verify other data.
The availability of mandatory disclosure reduces the costs of verifi-
cation.7 6 Furthermore, the SEC's creation and expansion of a cen-
tralized source of data reduces the social waste of analysts'
duplication of each other's efforts.7 7 Because the analyst industry is
competitively structured, 78 these cost savings should ultimately in-
ure to the benefit of investors generally. At the same time, some
issuer disclosure costs are reduced. An issuer may be competitively
injured by the disclosures it has to make. However, the competitive
gains achieved by access to the disclosures of other firms amelio-
rates these costs. 7 9
A third theoretical insight suggesting that mandatory disclosure
has value relates to the public-goods nature of information. A pub-
lic good is one that the first user, usually the payor for the good,
does not consume. Moreover, the first consumer cannot exclude
other users from obtaining the benefit of the good. 0 This gives
subsequent users a free ride on the first user's expenditures to pro-
duce the good. The free-riding problem reduces the incentive of
first users to produce the good for others. Consumers will under-
produce the good as they naturally decide to be free-riders rather
than payors, creating benefits for others.
Securities research-whose product is information and analy-
sis-meets the criteria of a public good. Because all users of the
product do not pay for its use, the product can be underprovided.
Mandatory disclosure can partially solve this problem. Mandatory
disclosure documents are particularly useful to analysts, if only be-
cause such documents enable an analyst to verify data obtained else-
where. By reducing the costs for analysts, mandatory disclosure
market efficiency, analysts should not earn returns sufficient to compensate them for
search costs. Thus, there is no incentive for investors to use their services. If the market
contains sufficient noise, though, investors can receive positive returns by using analysts.
75. The amount of use may vary on how closely a firm is followed. For the less-
followed securities traded in the over-the-counter market, the information content of
mandatory disclosure documents may be greater than with an actively-followed New
York Stock Exchange firm.
76. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 56, at 602-05.
77. Coffee, supra note 61, at 733.
78. The number of firms in the industry and the lack of barriers to entry show that
the industry does meet these structural criteria.
79. Walker, Forecast Disclosure. An Information Economics Perspective, 12 J. Bus. FIN. &
ACCT. 355 (1985).
80. Coffee, supra note 61, at 725.
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shifts some of the cost of research to issuers (and then to all inves-
tor-users, reflected in the cost of capital). Moreover, analysts are
particularly efficient users of the data, because they have economies
of scale in data evaluation."'
Thus, even without strong empirical evidence supporting the
mandatory disclosure requirements, one can make a good case that
mandatory disclosure provides benefits for investors. Self-imposed
disclosure may not produce sufficient information concerning issu-
ers. Mandatory disclosure, on the other hand, can increase the
stock of relevant information while reducing collection costs and
solving the problem of free-riding on the securities research of
others. Economy-wide disclosure also reduces the possibility that
competitive injury will arise as a consequence of firm-specific
disclosure.
IV. MANAGEMENT PROJECTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
MANDATORY DISCLOSURE DEBATE
The primary content of mandatory disclosure documents has
traditionally been historical data.82 Since historical data is only sug-
gestive of future performance, 83 many critics of the current struc-
ture of SEC-required disclosure argue that mandatory disclosure
should be refocused on future-oriented information such as earn-
ings projections.8 4
The debate over disclosure of projections has focused on three
issues. The first is whether management projections actually con-
tain new information so that access to such information would im-
prove investor welfare. If such predictions do contain new
81. Information in a single mandatory disclosure document, when combined with
other data known to the analyst, can be used to evaluate the securities of several issuers.
This spreads the cost of data evaluation across several securities and is a consequence of
industry-wide effects on specific firms.
82. The exception is in the area of going private transactions under SEC rule 13e-3.
17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1986). The issuer must file a disclosure statement under the rule
if the result of the transaction reported is the termination of continuous reporting obli-
gations under the 1934 Act. Schedule 13e-3 requires management to discuss its opinion
concerning the fairness of the transaction and the reasons for its opinion. This obliga-
tion can force the disclosure of third-party appraisals.
83. H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A
PURPOSE 24-31 (1979); Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U.
PA. L. REV. 254 (1972).
84. E.g., Kripke, A Search for a Meaningfiul Securities Disclosure Policy, 31 Bus. LAw. 293,
314-16 (1975); Note, Disclosure of Future-Oriented Information Under the Securities Laws, 88
YALE L.J. 338, 351-53 (1978). In this context I view projections and appraisals as
equivalent. See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
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information, management's future-oriented disclosures would pro-
vide useful information that is of predictive value. Such disclosures
also could provide useful data for investors to test the planning and
predictive abilities of firm managers. Such an ex post facto compari-
son with actual firm results would reveal information about the
likely quality of managers' future decisions." Arrayed against these
potential informational benefits is the potential harm that some in-
vestors would overemphasize the informational content of manage-
ment's disclosures, leading to market distortions or injuries to
unsophisticated investors.8 6
Second, would mandatory disclosure of management projec-
tions positively or adversely affect the firm (and its investors) in ways
unrelated to the informational content issues? A potential benefit is
the reduction of selective management disclosure of projections that
gives the recipient a potential trading advantage. 7 A potential det-
riment is the possible, competitive injury to issuers making future-
oriented disclosures, although the competitive gains achieved by ac-
cess to the disclosures of others may ameliorate this injury. More-
over, required disclosure of projections might increase securities
law liability risks for issuers. Other potential costs of this type of
increased mandatory disclosure stem from possible responses of
management to the requirement. Managers may alter their deci-
sions in ways detrimental to shareholders so that outcomes more
closely correspond with predictions. This could occur because now
a missed projection would signal very bad firm performance, similar
to the signal currently sent by a missed dividend. 8 Additionally,
managers may manage their reported earnings to make them corre-
spond with a previously announced forecast.89
The third issue concerns the question of institutional choice.
As with the more general question of the utility of any mandatory
disclosure system, one must ask whether an unregulated market sys-
tem produces optimal disclosure of projections or is regulatory in-
tervention necessary to reach an optimal solution. Managers may
have an incentive to disclose future-oriented information volunta-
85. Dev, Problems in Interpreting Prospectus Profit Forecasts, 3 ACCT. & Bus. RES. 110
(1973).
86. Comment, Mandatory Disclosure of Corporate Projections and the Goals of Securities Regu-
lation, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1525, 1542 (1981).
87. The insider trading issue is also related to the institutional-choice issue discussed
below.
88. Ferris, Profit Forecast Disclosure: The Effect on Managerial Behaviour, 5 AcCT. & Bus.
REs. 133 (1975).
89. Dev, supra note 85; Ferris, supra note 88.
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rily, similar to the incentive for self-induced disclosure of historical
data.9° In addition, voluntary informal disclosure through securities
analysts may be the most efficient method of communicating the in-
formation to investors.
A perfectly efficient stock market would not need the disclosure
of management projections.9 ' The price of the security would re-
flect completely both management's view of the firm's future pros-
pects and the collective judgment of investors as to the accuracy of
management's opinion. But informational asymmetry exists.92 Re-
alistically, management often has access to significant firm-specific
information unavailable to most investors. Managers also might be
better able to predict the effect of macroeconomic developments on
future firm performance.93 An earnings projection 94 or other soft
information would reveal such data.
As a consequence of superior access to information, managers
should be somewhat better able than outside investors to predict
future firm value. More complete access to management's views on
future worth should enhance market efficiency. Empirical evidence
supports the view that managers' nonpublic data is often material.
While in many instances the stock market accurately values the firm
in the hands of current managers,95 the market does not fully reflect
nonpublic information. Insiders who trade outperform investors
generally.96 Moreover, announced management projections impart
new information to the market, particularly if the projection is more
negative than preexisting views of the firm.97 Thus, on only an in-
90. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
91. Walker, supra note 79.
92. Gonedes, Dopuch & Penman, Disclosure Rules, Information-Production, and Capital
Market Equilibrium: The Case of Forecast Disclosure Rules, 14 J. AccT. RES. 89 (1976).
93. A large part of the uncertainty of all projections, including those by manage-
ment, is a consequence of the effect of economy-wide events on the firm.
94. Earnings projections play a central role because in most instances the value of a
firm is based on a calculation of capitalized earnings. HAWKINS & CAMPBELL, EQUITY
VALUATION: MODELS, ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS (1978).
95. See Dennis, Valuing the Firm and the Development of Delaware Corporate Law, 17
RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1985). This is based on the efficient market model. The market will
reach an unbiased judgment of value based on all available information. If there is no
unknown material fact concerning the firm, then the market price will be the best esti-
mate of intrinsic firm worth. In many instances, under the current regulatory scheme,
management's earning projection is known to the market, so that the total mix of firm-
specific data is complete.
96. Finnerty, Insiders and Market Efficiency, 31 J. FIN. 1141 (1976); Penman, Insider
Trading and the Dissemination of Firns Forecast Information, 55 J. Bus. 479 (1979). The abil-
ity to outperform the market could relate to operational information concerning earn-
ings or, in some control transaction situations, asset-valuation-based judgments.
97. Gondes, Dopuch & Penman, supra note 92. This also derives from Penman, supra
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formation-content basis, management disclosure of future-oriented
information provides some gain to investors.
Even though management projections do have informational
value for the market as a whole, some argue that systematic
mandatory disclosure could distort investment decisions and injure
unsophisticated investors because of undue reliance on the projec-
tions.9" The behavioral assumption behind this fear is that unso-
phisticated investors read and react to mandated disclosure
documents. This assumption remains unproven.9 9 Moreover, even
if true, unsophisticated laypersons would not normally suffer injury
because of misplaced reliance. The trading of professional investors
swamps the trades of the unsophisticated. t ° Thus, unless sophisti-
cated investors are also systematically misled in the same direction
as unsophisticated investors, the price-signalling mechanism would
protect unsophisticated investors from injury. Market professionals
today have considerable, informal (but not total) access to projec-
tions without apparent market distortion,' 0 ' so that this type of
marketwide injury is unlikely to occur.
More significant is the potential that under a system requiring
the disclosure of future-oriented data, management will distort its
decisionmaking so that projections are met.'0 2 Earnings lower than
projected would signal either a miscalculation of macroeconomic ef-
fects on the firm or, on a more firm-specific level, managerial failure.
The stock market traditionally reacts strongly to such negative
news.' O3 This places managers at risk in the market for corporate
control and adversely affects managerial compensation that is based
note 96. See also Nichols & Tsay, Security Price Reactions to Long-Range Executive Earnings
Forecasts, 17 J. AcCT. RES. 140 (1979); Patell, Corporate Forecasts of Earnings Per Share and
Stock Price Behavior: Empirical Tests, 14 J. ACCT. RES. 246 (1976); Penman, An Empirical
Investigation of the Voluntary Disclosure of Corporate Earnings Forecasts, 18 J. ACCT. RES. 132
(1980).
98. E.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400, 411 (N.D. Ill.
1964).
99. Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus. LAw. 631 (1973).
100. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 56, at 572; Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile
Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 300 (1983).
101. See infra notes 110-112 and accompanying text.
102. Preparation of the projection itself would not be a cost, since most firms already
internally create such information. Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some
Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151, 1200-01 (1970).
103. An analogy is the payment of dividends. Payment of dividends signals that re-
ported earnings are real. A cut in the dividend rate is promptly reflected in a significant
decline in the price of the security. See Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Divi-
dends, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 650 (1984).
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on stock market performance. Managers are thus faced with a con-
flict regarding forecast disclosure, creating agency costs.
Incentives are present to understate the initial projection10 4
and to manipulate reporting and behavior so that a projection is
met. Empirical evidence shows both phenomena occurring. In
Great Britain firms normally include forecasts in a prospectus to
comply with the London Stock Exchange requirement that the pro-
spectus contain a statement "as to the trading prospects of the com-
pany." ' 0 5 Projections are also routinely made in connection with
mergers and acquisitions as a consequence of The City Code on Take-
overs and Mergers.' 0 6 A significant number of companies in Great
Britain understate projected earnings when compared ex post facto
with actual earnings. 10 7 Apparently, this is often intentional to
avoid the negative aspects of forecast failure.'0 8 Firms also modify
behavior and accounting practices to obtain operating results con-
sistent with published disclosures.'0 9
An alleged benefit of mandated disclosure of management pro-
jections is the elimination of a "black market" in projected informa-
tion. Analysts and other institutional investors regularly attempt to
gain access to nonpublic management projections." 0 Reports sug-
gest that favored analysts obtain direct information on projections,
or at least receive an indication of whether their own projections are
similar to those of management. Favored analysts, or managers
themselves, can then trade on the information, earning supranormal
profits to the claimed disadvantage of investors without access.' " It
is hard to see how mandatory disclosure of soft information would
104. The countervailing pressure exists to inflate the projection, in order to increase
the apparent value of the firm.
105. THE FEDERATION OF STOCK EXCHANGES IN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, ADMIS-
SION OF SECURITIES TO QUOTATIONS (1966), quoted in Ferris, supra note 88. See also Com-
ment, British Profit Forecasting System: Model or Mistake For the United States?, 4 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 161, 162 (1973).
106. CITY WORKING PARTY, THE CITY CODE ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS 3-5 (1972).
Independent accountants audit these projections, just as they do with historical data.
For a description of the City Code on mergers and tender offers in Great Britain, see
Demott, Current Issues in Tender Offer Regulation: Lessons from the British, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV.
945 (1983).
107. Ninety percent of the projections issued during the time period studied by Ferris
were underestimated. Ferris, supra note 88.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Managers appear to act on the incentive to trade in advance of the disclosure of
the projection. Penman, supra note 96.
111. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, U.S. SEC, REPORT OF RECOM-
MENDATIONS, 56 (1977).
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significantly affect these practices when management may prepare a
routine projection long in advance of the obligation to disclose it in
an annual or quarterly report. Thus, as with mandatory disclosure
generally, mandatory disclosure of projections would only have a
marginal effect on insider trading."12
The policy implications of widespread legal trading on not-gen-
erally-released soft data makes the question of institutional choice
particularly complex. Current regulations against insider trading
only make some direct and tippee trading on nonpublic information
illegal."l 3 To find illegal insider trading a court would first have to
determine that the nonpublic data was material." 4 In addition, in
the tipping context, the court would have to uncover a personal pe-
cuniary gain to the tipper arising from the tip.' l 5 Pecuniary gain
includes payment for the tip, information swapping, and reputa-
tional gain that may translate into future earnings for the tipper."t 6
The requirement for pecuniary gain reduces the possibility that a tip
for the benefit of the tipping firm (rather than for the individual
making the tip) would lead to a finding of illegal insider trading by
the tippee. Although the recent insider trading scandal shows that
some tips are indeed paid for with cash or by information swaps, the
usual release of information to an analyst, outside the control trans-
action context, is for the company's benefit.
This split in the current law is sensible. The pecuniary-gain
rule reduces an agency cost problem. The rule discourages selec-
tive disclosure when the motivation is individual gain, rather than
benefit for the firm. Furthermore, the rule as currently constructed
is consistent with the notion of self-induced disclosure. Issuers have
an incentive to provide the market with soft as well as hard informa-
tion, choosing the most efficient market mechanism for the dissemi-
nation of the data, although as already noted these incentives are
not perfect.
Selective self-induced disclosure, as a method of disseminating
112. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
113. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-54, 664 (1983).
114. This would require an analysis of the same difficult factual questions the courts
face when determining the importance of a management projection in the control trans-
action context. Moreover, information may be more important, i.e., more material, to a
particular expert analyst than it would be to investors generally.
115. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662.
116. Id. at 663. Reputational gain occurs when the tipper expects some kind of per-
sonal gain in the future from the tippee, even if not a direct information swap. See SEC
v. Gaspar, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,004, at 90,979
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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management information, has considerable benefit. 1 7 Analysts are
efficient processors of information. They are able to verify'18 and
evaluate disclosures at a low cost; thus, disclosure through them, as
opposed to a general disclosure, may reduce costs for investors' 9
and firms alike. Selective analyst disclosure may also reduce the
competitive injury that might arise from disclosure of future firm
activity. A collateral benefit of selective disclosure is the reduction
of legal risk to the firm if the projection turns out to be in error. 20
The costs of selective tipping permitted under the pecuniary-
gain rule are difficult to assess. General rather than selective release
of the projection might lead to more rapid incorporation of all the
information into the market price. But in many instances release of
the information to enough members of the analyst community is
equivalent to general release. Again, because of the sporadic nature
of mandatory disclosure, an expanded mandatory duty to disclose
projections should have little effect on this element of market effi-
ciency. Selective tipping would also create the appearance that the
stock market is not a fair game. The costs of this perception to the
cost of capital and to the decline of personal investment in the mar-
ket is again hard to quantify.
A final argument concerning the cost of mandatory disclosure
of projections is the concern over liability. If a projection turns out
to be incorrect, issuers fear that investors could bring a securities
fraud action against the issuer and various collateral participants.
Some cases do hold issuers liable for incorrect projections 12 1 on the
theory that an uninformed projection or one that was made without
a reasonable basis is false. 12 2 On the other hand, rule 175 protects
an issuer from liability for projections included in SEC-filed docu-
ments if the issuer meets the rule's good faith, reasonable basis stan-
dard.'12  In addition, actions brought under rule lOb-5 require the
plaintiff to prove scienter. 124 Even with the safe-harbor and scienter
117. Fischel, supra note 73, at 142.
118. Verification serves a monitoring function. Analysts have an incentive to protect
their own reputations. They do not want, nor can they afford, to be gulled by managers;
therefore, analysts should attempt to verify a selective disclosure before communicating
it.
119. As with mandatory disclosure generally, this reduces wasteful search costs for the
whole investor community.
120. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
121. E.g., Beecher v. Able, 374 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See supra note 16.
122. Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 490 (9th Cir. 1974).
123. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1986). The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show lack
of good faith and reasonable basis.
124. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 & n.12 (1976).
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protections, many issuers do not formally disclose projections be-
cause of the liability concern; rather, issuers use the informal analyst
network to disclose soft data. The issuers' market behavior, there-
fore, suggests that the liability risk is not trivial, even though there
have been only a few lawsuits over projections.
Balancing the benefits and costs of the current, unregulated
system of projection disclosure is an uncertain business. The unreg-
ulated projection market does not seem to have some of the costs
associated with a mandatory disclosure system. Managers may be
less likely with informal projections to change substantive or report-
ing behavior to conform firm performance with a projection. Ana-
lysts can efficiently process and verify informal communications.
The concern over liability, the potential for distortion of manage-
ment behavior, and the fact that self-induced disclosure through in-
formal channels of communication might provide investors with
considerable information concerning management projections all
raise the issue of institutional choice. Thus, the current, unregu-
lated market has some benefits over a mandatory system. But self-
induced disclosure is not a perfect mechanism. Voluntary disclo-
sure of soft data is particularly subject to management manipula-
tion, as shown by the empirical data.' 25 The unregulated market
also creates a marginally enhanced risk of insider trading. Finally, in
some instances the unregulated market does not produce sufficient
access to managers' soft data-for example, when management does
not disclose arguably material soft data in certain control
transactions.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR LIMITED MANDATORY
DISCLOSURE OF PROJECTIONS
In order to determine whether the mandatory disclosure system
should be expanded to include projections, one must assess whether
the gain in information from additional disclosure, as compared to
market-driven, self-induced disclosure, is worth the cost of an addi-
tional mandatory disclosure requirement. The history of case devel-
opment suggests that a rule-based answer is necessary. The tests
proposed by the courts vary considerably, and the competing con-
cerns can best be sorted out in a rulemaking proceeding rather than
by case-by-case adjudication.
As with the debate concerning the utility of mandatory disclo-
sure of historical data, mandatory disclosure of soft information
125. Ferris, supra note 88.
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makes the most sense as a method for improving information
processing by market professionals and when limited to situations in
which incentives for self-induced disclosure are reduced. In many
instances, self-induced disclosure seems to be the optimal solution.
Except for the leveraged buyout situation, the incentives for manag-
ers to disclose positive soft information are high. 12 6 Self-induced
disclosure also would presumably occur in instances in which the
possibility of management distortion is low.' 27 Moreover, in the
routine case, senior managers of the issuer with access to the most
complete information are in the best position to assess the benefits
of disclosure to the firm. The cost of capital would reflect these
benefits, and corporate decisionmakers would weigh the benefits
against the costs to the firm of potential legal liability and competi-
tive injury. If the competitive injury factor is high, the corporation
could choose informal disclosure through analysts rather than more
formal disclosure.
But in two instances the incentives for self-induced disclosure
are seriously attenuated; first, when management has prepared an
unexpectedly negative projection; and second, when a control trans-
action is pending so that managers may not believe they will be re-
peat players in the capital market with that firm or that the gains
from the transaction might be extraordinarily large. For market
professionals, access to a projection in each instance would provide
significant information leading to enhanced market efficiency.
Control transactions are sufficiently sporadic and easily identifi-
able that it would be administratively simple to draft a rule specifi-
cally targeted at disclosure of projections and appraisals in these
instances. Firms usually prepare projections for internal use in con-
nection with transactions or other corporate activities occurring at
the same time.' 28 The categories of control transactions that should
require mandatory disclosure of projections include issuer and con-
sensual third-party tender offers, 129 mergers, open-market repur-
126. Ferris, supra note 88, shows that managers do often promptly disclose positive
soft data.
127. Because of the liability risk and the possibility of adverse reaction to a missed
projection, managers should voluntarily disclose projections with the highest probability
of occurrence. These types of projections would be least subject to later manipulation.
128. Ruder, Disclosure of Financial Projections-Developments, Problems, and Techniques, 1974
INST. ON SEC. REG. 12. In acquisition analysis, informal asset appraisal is often also done.
See Dennis, supra note 95, at 6 n.15.
129. My proposal is not intended to change the duty to speak. Some preexisting trans-
action or continuous disclosure obligation would trigger this expanded disclosure obli-
gation. In addition, the purchaser in a nonconsensual, third-party tender without access
to target management data should only have to disclose its own earning projections.
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chase programs, and other types of going-private transactions or
recapitalizations that need shareholder approval. The SEC already
requires mandatory, advanced disclosure in all of these instances,
except in an open-market repurchasing program.' 3 0 Thus, it would
be easy to piggy-back an additional disclosure requirement onto the
preexisting regulatory scheme.
With this expanded disclosure obligation, one must ask what
type of soft data needs to be disclosed and what additional support-
ing information a firm should disclose to ensure that the disclosure
is not misleading. Since firms are primarily valued on the basis of
future earnings, disclosure of earnings projections should be a core
item of any expanded disclosure requirement. An additional disclo-
sure of any appraisal could be justified if corporate decisionmakers
prepared or used asset valuations in any reportable transaction.
With respect to supporting data, the current regulatory scheme
gives some deference to the issuer. There is no absolute obligation
to disclose assumptions or information concerning the certainty of
those assumptions. 13 1 If a firm does not disclose these data and
they are subsequently deemed material, the projection can be
deemed materially false. 32 A prudent issuer might therefore want
routinely to make such disclosures. However, in some instances, an
assumption might contain the most sensitive type of competitive in-
formation.' 3 3 Thus, leaving the disclosure of assumptions and vari-
ance analysis to issuers' discretion is the optimal solution. s4
The unexpected, negative projection case in the absence of a
There should be no requirement that the purchaser reveal projected gains from the
transaction, because this might require it to reveal its discovery gain. See Comment, supra
note 3, at 117. For a similar rule-based approach to disclosure in tender offer situations,
see Fordham Note, supra note 24, at 842-44.
130. When a tender offer is pending, the target must disclose any repurchase program
under rule 13e-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-1 (1986).
131. Securities Act Release No. 6084, supra note 15. The SEC Advisory Committee
on Tender Offers recommended that companies be required to disclose assumptions
underlying a projection issued during a tender offer. ADviSORY COMMrITEE ON TENDER
OFFERS, U.S. SEC, REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS (1983). The Commission did not
adopt this recommendation.
132. Beecher v. Able, 374 F. Supp. 341, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
133. For example, knowledge of the predicted growth in market demand might be the
product of expensive market research and underlie a projected increase in sales.
134. If disclosure of assumptions and variance information was mandated, a useful
model of such requirements could be found in Auditing Standards Board, American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Statement on Standards for Accountants' Serv-
ices on Perspective Financial Information (1985). For a description of the accountant's
role, see Danos, Holt & Imhoff, Auditors' Current and Future Involvement in Corporate Finan-
cial Forecasts, in SyMPOSiUM ON AUDITING RESEARCH (Schultz & Brown eds. 1982); Pallais
& Guy, Prospective Financial Statements, 161 J. AcCT. 90 (1986).
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control transaction presents the more difficult disclosure questions
because the preexisting reporting obligations are different and the
definition of a negative trigger is more imprecise. Unless a prior
disclosure creates a duty to update a projection, 3 5 the only current
reporting obligations are the 1934 continuous disclosure require-
ments.' 3 6 If the expanded reporting requirement is only piggy-
backed onto the current scheme, then the usual reporting trigger
would be a 1O-Q quarterly report. Quarterly reporting makes timeli-
ness an issue, and reduced timeliness reduces the information gain
that supports an expanded duty. The information gain is further
limited by the already current duty to describe adverse trends in the
management discussion section of continuous disclosure
documents.
Making an unexpectedly negative projection an 8-K item could
improve timeliness. 3 7 But if this solution were adopted, managers
would face considerable uncertainty in determining when a tentative
projection became sufficiently probable to require disclosure.,38
Furthermore, drafting a rule to allow an issuer to withhold some but
not all projections requires an identification of exactly what consti-
tutes an unexpectedly negative projection. Even a projection that
shows substantial positive earnings can be unexpectedly negative
for investors. Conversely, a lower-than-expected loss can be good
news. Moreover, not making a projection report under an unex-
pected-negative-report regime creates the potential for litigation,
even if the negative outcome was in fact unexpected by managers.
Faced with these substantial implementation problems, the benefit
of additional information in the market outside of the control trans-
action does not, in my judgment, outweigh the costs of a new regu-
latory program. Considering the regulatory costs, a perfect
information market is not a reasonable goal. Thus, under the ap-
proach suggested here, mandatory disclosure of soft data should
only be required in control transactions.
135. Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1974).
136. Of course, for those courts who believe that projections can be material informa-
tion, the rules against insider trading may well require disclosure during an issuer repur-
chasing program. Ruder, supra note 128.
137. Form 8-K now only requires disclosure of extraordinary events, such as changes
in control, major acquisitions, or filing for bankruptcy.
138. An uncertain projection may not be material.
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